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This study has two research objectives: (1) to find evidence
whether investment decisions (allocation of funds in each asset in a
portfolio) of Indonesian investors in the short investment horizon
diverge with their investment decisions in the long investment
horizon, and (2) to examine the belief of Indonesian investors in the
mean reversion. This study analyzes the investment horizon from a
behavioral point of view by examining the influence of investment
horizon on investment decision and mean reversion in Indonesia. We
employed the students of Master of Science, Master of Management,
and Doctorate Programs at the Faculty of Economics and Business,
Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia as the sample in this research.
Of the 217 questionnaires delivered, 172 questionnaires were com-
pletely filled and utilized in this study.
The main findings of this study are as follows: (1) it is signifi-
cantly proved that Indonesian investors are inclined to assume
higher portfolio risk in the longer investment horizon than that in the
shorter investment horizon; (2) it is very interesting to see that on
average, the investors are inclined to increase their allocation in the
risk-free asset in the longer investment horizon although the differ-
ence between the risk-free asset holding in the short investment
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Introduction
Investment horizon can be defined
as the period of time someone plans to
put his or her money aside to invest
(Wu 2002). Life expectancy and pen-
sionable age are the salient factors
influencing the investment horizon,
which then determines portfolio con-
struction since the longer the invest-
ment horizon, the less risky the portfo-
lio (Crabtree et al. 2000). A rule of
thumb dictates that the older a person,
the more risk-averse he will be
(Hawawini and Viallet 1999). Crabtree
et al. (2000) divide investment strate-
gies into five types, based on inves-
tors’ investment horizons:
1. Income or principal preservation.
This strategy is primarily used by
retired investors who want to “live
off” their investments, usually only
taking the interest earned and main-
taining principal. These investors
may invest in corporate bonds, gov-
ernment bonds, utilities funds, or
real estate investment trusts.
2. Typical conservative growth. It is
generally mulled for individuals
whose investment horizons are be-
tween 5 and 10 years. These inves-
tors may invest in blue-chip funds
(20%), corporate bonds (15%),
value funds (10%), utilities funds
(15%), high yield funds (15%),
growth funds (15%), and equity in-
come funds (10%).
3. Typical moderate growth. This type
is usually used for individuals whose
time horizons are 10 – 15 years.
They may invest in growth funds
(20%), value funds (20%), small
cap value funds (20%), high yield
funds (20%), and blue-chip funds
(20%).
4. Typical aggressive growth. This
strategy is purported for investors
whose time frames are more than 15
years. These investors can invest in
aggressive growth funds (20%),
LQ45 Index funds (20%), small cap
growth funds (20%), emerging mar-
ket funds (20%), and international
growth funds (20%).
Keywords: investment horizon; investment decision; mean reversion
horizon and that in the long investment horizon is not significant; (3)
the framing effect significantly influences the investment decisions,
both in short investment horizon and in long investment horizon; (4)
there is a tendency for the respondents to show a willingness to
assume higher portfolio risk when they received the questionnaires
that provided the historical five-year returns on the first page; (5)
investors predict an asset gaining 50 percent in the first year to
continuously gain in the next four years while expecting an asset
losing 25 percent in the first year to continuously loss in the next four
years.
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5. Speculation. It is adopted by inves-
tors who are endeavoring to acquire
maximum returns without regard-
ing the risk. Derivatives securities,
such as options and futures, are very
tempting and challenging for them.
Investment decisions are supposed
to be a function of expected returns,
variance, and covariance structure of
all investment alternatives’ returns
(Markowitz 1952). However, infor-
mational constraints or bounded ratio-
nality may prevent ordinary investors
from considering correlations or cova-
riances when making portfolio alloca-
tions (Siebenmorgen et al. 2000).
Nonetheless, at the very least, they
should think of the expected returns
and likely risk estimate of an invest-
ment.
Meanwhile, mean reversion, al-
though sounds formidable, is a simple
statistical concept. The concept is more
popular with the term “regression to
the mean” (Dreman, 1998). Mean re-
version or regression toward the mean
was discovered over 100 years ago by
Sir Francis Galton, and it was named
the law of universal regression. In his
famous paper, Galton (1886) (in
Gujarati 1995; Dreman 1998) finds
that although there is a tendency for
tall parents to have tall children and for
short parents to have short children,
the average height of children born of
parents of a given height tends to move
or regress toward the average height in
the population as a whole. Hence, the
tallest men usually have shorter sons
while the shortest men usually have
taller sons (Dreman 1998). Since many
tall men come from families of aver-
age height, they are likely to have
children shorter than they are, and vice
versa. In other words, in the long run,
the height of men will always return to
the mean or average.
The result of Galton can then be
applied for the securities market. Ac-
cording to the classic work of Ibbotson
and Sinquefield (in Dreman 1998),
stocks had returned 10.5 percent annu-
ally over the last 70 years while the
returns on investing in bonds were 5.6
percent. Short-term returns that are
extremely high or low should be treated
as deviations from long-term norms
(Graflund 2001). Accordingly, inves-
tors who realize and believe in mean-
reverting phenomenon will as much as
possible invest in stocks when their
investment horizons are long. The main
rationale is that they are convinced
that stocks will always give positive
and higher returns than will fixed-
income securities in the long-term con-
dition. Hence, they will not care about
the risk and are sure that average stock
returns will always outperform those
of fixed-income securities since it is a
long-term norm of regression toward
the mean. Siebenmorgen and Weber
(2000) empirically find that German
market participants significantly be-
lieve in mean-reverting asset prices,
and it is the main explanation for their
finding that investors whose invest-
ment horizons are long are inclined to
allocate a higher proportion of their
funds in stocks. A similar result is
found by Frennberg and Hansson
(1993) (in Graflund 2001) who re-
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searched on the Swedish stock market,
proving that stock returns exhibit mean
reversion. Risager (1998) also finds
that mean reversion prevails on the
Danish stock market. In contrast,
Graflund (2001), using monthly nomi-
nal data for the period of 1947-1998,
finds evidence that Nordic stock mar-
kets (Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and
Norway) are not subject to mean re-
version. This finding is in line with the
result of Nielsen and Olesen (2000)
who find a weak support for mean
reversion on the Danish stock market.
They remark that the mean reversion
recently found on many capital mar-
kets is due to the recent prevalent high-
return-high-volatility regime.
Research Objectives
This study has two research ob-
jectives: (1) to find evidence whether
investment decisions (allocation of
funds in each asset in a portfolio) of
Indonesian investors in the short in-
vestment horizon diverge with their
investment decisions in the long in-
vestment horizon, and (2) to examine
the belief of Indonesian investors in
the mean reversion.
Research Benefits
Benefits to be obtained from this
study’s findings are: (1) the evidence
is supposed to give recommendations
for Indonesian investors of how they
should allocate their funds in estab-
lishing their portfolios, both in the
short horizon and in the long horizon,
and (2) the results will enrich empiri-
cal evidence on this topic and may
entice other researchers to further in-
vestigate these phenomena in the fu-
ture.
This paper is divided into five
sections. The first section is an intro-
duction section.  The second part dis-
cusses literature review and hypoth-
eses development. Subsequently, re-
search method is discussed in the third
section. Section 4 comprises data analy-
sis and discussion. Eventually, con-
clusions, implications, and suggestions
are drawn in the final section.
Literature Review and
Hypotheses Development
The process of selecting a portfo-
lio can be divided into two stages. The
first stage starts with observations and
experiences, and ends with beliefs
about the future performance of avail-
able securities. The second stage be-
gins with the relevant beliefs about the
future performance and ends with the
choice of portfolios (Markowitz 1952).
Moreover, we recognize two traditional
and well-known approaches to analyz-
ing and selecting securities: (1) funda-
mental analysis and (2) technical analy-
sis. While investors who believe in
fundamental analysis are focused on
finding the intrinsic value or theoreti-
cal value of a security or a portfolio,
investors convinced by the technical
analysis strive to search for identifi-
able and recurring stock price patterns
(Jones 2000).
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The choice of an optimal portfo-
lio of assets is a classic problem both
for academics and practitioners. It is
generally accepted among practitio-
ners that investment horizon plays a
crucial role in determining the optimal
composition of an investment portfo-
lio. A common advice from stock mar-
ket professionals is that long-term in-
vestors should invest a larger propor-
tion in more risky assets, such as stocks,
than should investors with shorter in-
vestment horizons. The idea is that the
riskiness of stocks diminishes with the
length of an investor’s time horizon
subsequent to the “time diversifica-
tion” effect. According to Radcliffe
(2002), for young individuals, the value
of security investments represents a
smaller fraction of their true wealth
(present value of future income) than
for individuals approaching retire-
ments. Hence, they may take greater
risk in their security portfolios when
they are young. There is extensive
economic research on the question,
whether rational investment consult-
ants should advise younger investors
with longer investment horizons to
hold more risky assets, like stocks and
index funds, than older investors with
shorter investment horizons
(Siebenmorgen and Weber 2000).
Samuelson (1963) (in
Siebenmorgen and Weber 2000)
launched this discussion by examin-
ing single and repeated decisions un-
der risk. He proves that an expected
utility-maximizer would never accept
a series of lotteries if he is not willing
to accept only one single lottery. Predi-
cated on the results, Samuelson (1969)
(in Booth 2002; Graflund and Nilsson
2002) then preaches that it is an exact
theorem that investment horizon has
no effect on the portfolio proportion.
Another research was conducted by
Albrecht et al. (2001) who examined
risk and performance of long-term
stock investments in Germany, find-
ing that the question whether stocks
dominate bonds or other less risky
investments in the long run counts on
the used definition of risk. Using dif-
ferent forms of shortfall measures to
quantify risk, they find that risk mea-
sures have a persistent characteristic,
meaning that the corresponding risk
measure does not converge rapidly but
rather slowly against zero and that
even for very long time horizon (30
years), the risk remains at a substan-
tially high level. Accordingly, inves-
tors should beware to believe that rela-
tive risk in the long-term horizon is
lower than that in the short-term hori-
zon since it hinges on the definition of
the risk. They conclude that the analy-
sis of mean excess loss reveals the true
danger of a long-term investment in
stocks. From a worst-case perspective,
the risk of a stock investment increases
with the investment period and reaches
substantial levels.
However, those prepositions are
obviously contradictory with the rec-
ommendations of professional advi-
sors who generally recommend varia-
tions on “your age in bonds rule”, that
is at age 30 you should have 30 percent
in bonds while at age 70 you should
have 70 percent.
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This recommendation is in line
with our discussion above that inves-
tors who have long investment hori-
zons may harness a benefit of lower
relative risk in the long run compared
to the investors whose investment ho-
rizons are short. Besides, Swedroe
(1998) proposes two reasons for the
recommendation: (1) as the invest-
ment horizon increases, so does the
likelihood that equities would outper-
form the “safer” fixed-income alterna-
tives and (2) as the investment horizon
increases, so does the risk that infla-
tion would outrun the returns provided
by the fixed-income assets.
Much empirical research has
yielded results consistent with stan-
dard advice given by financial plan-
ners to their investors. Historically,
holding an investment in equities for a
long horizon has lowered the risk of
losing money (Yoo 1998). He investi-
gated the Standard & Poor’s 500 Com-
posite Index during the period of 1871-
1998, and finds that holding equities
for a long horizon hardly produces a
loss; however, it does not shrink the
range of probable outcomes. Ander-
son and Settle (1996) and Schooley
and Worden (1999) (in Siebenmorgen
and Weber 2000) also show that long-
term investors in fact tend to allocate a
greater percentage of their funds to
risky investments. Derivatives Strat-
egy (1996) delineates that pension
funds increase their allocation in eq-
uity assets from 34 percent to 55 per-
cent as the investment horizon changes
from 1 year to 10 years due to a reduc-
tion in the risk or volatility of equity
investments when held over a longer
period.
Booth (2002) utilized a model
based on chance-constrained program-
ming in order to reconcile the standard
advice given by financial planners with
the orthodox results from financial
economists that the equity allocation
is independent of the time horizon. He
eventually finds that in the United
States, equity allocation increases with
the time horizon although the impor-
tance of that allocation to the overall
portfolio decreases. Graflund and
Nilsson (2002) conducted research on
the relevance of switching regimes
and investment horizon on the four
largest stock markets in the world: the
United States (S&P 500), Japan
(Nikkei), the United Kingdom (FTSE),
and Germany (DAX). They established
optimal portfolios for investors with
investment horizons ranging from 1
month to 10 years. Given a specific
regime, an investor is inclined to in-
crease the exposure to stocks when the
investment horizon increases. How-
ever, Japan is the exception and this is
consistent with the finding of Kasuga
and Iwamoto (1998). Graflund and
Nilsson (2002) reveal that the investor
would hold risky assets both since the
expected returns are higher than the
risk-free rate and since it would serve
as an intemporal hedge.
Subsequently, Strong and Taylor
(1999) (in Siebenmorgen and Weber
2000) took historical data to confirm
such a time diversification that had
positive impacts on portfolio alloca-
tion problem. Depending on the in-
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vestment strategy and the utility func-
tion of the investors, they were able to
rationalize empirically more risky as-
sets in portfolios for longer investment
horizons.
Siebenmorgen and Weber (2000)
conducted empirical research in Ger-
many where they delivered 110 ques-
tionnaires to advanced finance stu-
dents at M.B.A. Program of the Uni-
versity of Mannheim. They find a sig-
nificant difference between one-year
and five-year portfolio risk envisioned
by the participants. When the partici-
pants thought of the short-term invest-
ment horizon, they invested 28.4 per-
cent in the risk-free asset. For long-
term investment horizon, however, they
were prone to invest in more risky
portfolios with a mean proportion of
the risk-free asset of 23.5 percent.
Moreover, the evidence exhibits that
51 of the participants increased the
portfolio risk for the long-run portfo-
lio compared to their short-term port-
folio whereas only 33 participants ac-
cepted less portfolio risk for the five-
year investment horizon compared to
their one-year investment horizon.
They conclude that the participants’
biases in volatility forecasts and sub-
jective risk assessments significantly
influence the willingness to accept the
portfolio risk. However, volatility fore-
cast is not synonymous with subjec-
tive risk assessment, and Siebenmorgen
et al. (2000) and Siebenmorgen and
Weber (2000) prove that it is the per-
ceived risk or subjective risk assess-
ment that has a higher explanatory
power on asset selection.
The facts that the recommenda-
tions of professional advisors and
“sages” are so at odds with the ortho-
dox financial theory, and that the topic
is so fundamental in finance have
tempted significant discussion over the
year. The conflict between the profes-
sional investment advice with the or-
thodox financial economic theory has
been termed a “puzzle”, which has
withstood various tweaks to it in order
to generate conclusions consistent with
reality. Hence, the first hypothesis in
this study is:
H1: Investment decision (allocation of
funds in each asset in a portfolio)
in the short investment horizon
diverges with the investment deci-
sion in the long investment hori-
zon for Indonesian investors.
Mean reversion, although it
sounds formidable, is a simple statisti-
cal concept. The concept is more popu-
lar with the term “regression to the
mean” (Dreman 1998). This statistical
phenomenon was noted over 100 years
ago by Sir Francis Galton, a pioneer in
eugenics. What interesting is that both
of proponents of efficient market hy-
pothesis and proponents of behavioral
finance claim that the mean reversion
phenomenon is in favor of each side.
In a world of certainty, efficient allo-
cation of capital would be evidenced
by equality of the yield for all forms of
investments. However, when we turn
to actual world of uncertainty, we find
that the yield realized on alternative
forms of investment differ drastically
(Hirshleifer 1964). He subsequently
explains that in general, there are two
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main types of responses to this evi-
dence. On the one hand, one school
reveals that the evidence indicates im-
perfection of capital market where it is
rife with rationing, ignorance, differ-
ential tax treatments, reluctance to fi-
nance investment from external funds,
slow adjustment process, etc. On the
other hand, another school maintains
that the divergence of observed yields
conceals an underlying harmony of
the capital market. Those who hold it
feel that the search for a consistent
structure amid the seeming confusion
of observed yields would ultimately
be rewarded.
An efficient market can be de-
fined as a market in which prices of
securities quickly and fully reflect all
available information (Jones 2000;
Elton and Gruber 1995). Thus, infor-
mation is the key to the determination
of stock prices and accordingly is the
central issue of the efficient market
concept. A market is said efficient
relative to any information set if inves-
tors are unable to earn abnormal prof-
its by using the information set in their
investing decisions since it is already
impounded in prices (Jones 2000). The
information embraces: (1) past infor-
mation, (2) current information, and
(3) information that can be inferred.
Academics and practitioners usually
discuss the efficient market concept in
the form of the efficient market hy-
pothesis. The efficient market hypoth-
esis, proposed by Fama (1970), is an
idea that securities markets are effi-
cient, with the prices of securities re-
flecting their economic value or intrin-
sic value (in Fama 1998). Therefore, it
makes sense to reveal that assets are
priced in such a manner that investors
are not able to exploit any discrepan-
cies and earn abnormal returns after
considering all transaction costs. The
efficient market hypothesis can be di-
vided into three cumulative types: (1)
weak form, where historical price and
volume data should already be reflected
in current prices and should be of no
value in predicting future price
changes; (2) semistrong form, where
this form is a more comprehensive
level of market efficiency that encom-
passes not only known and publicly
available market data, but also all pub-
licly known and available data; and (3)
strong form, where prices are believed
to reflect all information, either public
or private information.
After the emergence of the effi-
cient market hypothesis, worldwide
academics have been endeavoring to
empirically examine the hypothesis.
Most of the evidence exhibits that ef-
ficient market hypothesis obviously
holds, at least up to the semistrong-
form efficiency. It indicates that inves-
tors and capital markets behave ratio-
nally such that investors who try to
capture abnormal returns by exploit-
ing information will earn nothing al-
though in the short run, they may be
skillful or lucky to get abnormal re-
turns. However, many empirical re-
sults also show deviations from the
efficient market hypothesis. Fama
(1998) who defend the efficient mar-
ket hypothesis calls them market
anomalies. By definition, market
85
Junarsin & Tandelilin—Investment Horizon to Investment Decision and Mean Reversion
anomalies are techniques or strategies
that appear to be contrary to an effi-
cient market (Jones 2000).
The efficient market hypothesis
reached the height of its dominance in
academic circles around the 1970s.
Faith in the hypothesis was eroded by
a succession of discoveries of anoma-
lies, many in the 1980s, and of evi-
dence of excess volatility of returns
(Shiller 2002). The salient market
anomalies are:
1. P/E ratio effect. Findings of em-
pirical studies exhibit that low P/E
ratio stocks tend to outperform the
high P/E ratio stocks. Basu (in Jones
2000) also proves that low P/E ratio
stocks generally have higher risk-
adjusted returns than stocks with
high P/E ratios. Moreover, the P/E
ratio effect remains significant even
after adjustments are made for dif-
ferences in firm size.
2. Size effect. Size effect is the ob-
served tendency for smaller firms to
have higher stock returns than do
large firms. Zunna, Inc. (2001) ex-
amined the New York Stock Ex-
change, and proves that in the pe-
riod of 1996-2000, small cap stocks
performed better than did large cap
stocks. The result was substantiated
for a longer investment horizon.
3. January effect. This is the observed
inclination that abnormal returns are
more often found in January than in
other months, especially for small-
company stocks. Algifari (1999)
finds a Monday effect on the Indo-
nesian capital market. He empiri-
cally proves that stock returns on
Monday were lower than those on
other trading days in Indonesia.
There are virtually many other
market anomalies. The most promi-
nent one is the investor overreaction
hypothesis. The hypothesis is under-
lain by the burgeoning of behavioral
finance. According to Shefrin (2000)
and Shiller (2002), behavioral finance
is financial science that applies broader
social science perspectives, including
psychology and sociology, and ac-
knowledges their implications on fi-
nancial behavior. While traditional fi-
nance is built on the preposition that
investors act rationally on the basis of
utility theory, behavioral finance rec-
ognizes that investors can and do be-
have irrationally (Shiller 2001;
Barberis and Thaler 2002). Shefrin
(2000) elaborates that error is indeed
human, but financial practitioners of
all types, from portfolio managers to
corporate executives, commit the same
mistakes repeatedly. Nevertheless,
absorbing all lessons of behavioral fi-
nance does not mean that we must
reject the market efficiency (Barberis
and Thaler 2002). Instead, we have to
realize that people may sometimes be
trapped into cognitive bias which may
entice them to deviate from rational
behavior. According to Shefrin (2000),
there are three themes that distinguish
the traditional finance from the behav-
ioral finance:
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1. Heuristic-driven bias. Behavioral
finance believes that financial practi-
tioners commit errors since they hinge
on rules of thumb whereas traditional
finance does not acknowledge the use
of rules of thumb. One example of the
rule of thumb is: past performance is
the best predictor of future perfor-
mance, thus we must invest in a mutual
fund showing the best five-year record.
Therefore, practitioners hold biased
beliefs that predispose them to commit
errors. This bias is labeled heuristic-
driven bias.
Traditional theories of finance
posit that the pricing of securities in
financial markets should be conducted
according to the quality of their under-
lying technical fundamentals
(MacGregor et al. 2000). However,
research on financial markets has indi-
cated that factors other than technical
fundamentals are often used by market
participants to gauge the value of secu-
rities. This phenomenon may be quite
prevalent in markets for initial public
offerings (IPOs) where securities lack
a financial history. MacGregor et al.
(2000) find that imaginary and affect
are part of a coherent psychological
framework for evaluating classes of
securities, but the framework may have
low validity for predicting perfor-
mance.
Crowell (1994) summarizes the
sources of cognitive bias into: (1) rep-
resentativeness and (2) aversion to re-
gret. According to Tversky and
Kahneman (1982) (in Crowell 1994),
representativeness heuristic means that
we evaluate the probability of an un-
certain event by the degree which it:
(a) is similar in essential properties to
its parent population or previous events
and (b) reflects the salient features by
which it is generated. Hence, Shefrin
and Statman (1984) find that promi-
nent investors overestimate the prob-
ability that a big company is a good
stock since good stocks are similar to
big companies even though they real-
ized that small cap stocks usually out-
perform the large cap stocks (in Shefrin
2000). Meanwhile, aversion to regret
is acute when an individual must take
a responsibility for the final outcome.
Aversion to regret is different from
aversion to risk (Crowell 1994). For
the example of choosing stocks, aver-
sion to regret drives to a preference for
stocks of good companies. The choice
of stocks of bad companies involves
more personal responsibility and higher
potential for regret. Conversely, if in-
vestors own stocks of good companies
and their prices then slump, the inves-
tors may argue that unforeseeable
events have occurred and accordingly
they feel no regret.
Actually, there are other possible
sources of the cognitive bias, such as
peer pressure, availability bias, an-
choring, hindsight bias, social reality,
overconfidence, and so on (Institute of
Psychology and Markets, 2000).
2. Framing effect. Behavioral finance
postulates that in addition to objective
considerations, practitioners’ percep-
tions of risk and return are strongly
influenced by how decision problems
are framed. In turn, traditional finance
assumes frame independence, mean-
87
Junarsin & Tandelilin—Investment Horizon to Investment Decision and Mean Reversion
ing that practitioners view all deci-
sions through the transparent and ob-
jective lens of risk and return.
As discussed in the previous sec-
tion, investors rely on historical re-
turns to set their expected returns since
future returns are uncertain. However,
the method of describing or exhibiting
the historical returns per se may influ-
ence the expected returns formulated
by an investor. For instance, Crowell
(1994) states that people’s brains
handle visual images much better than
a list of numbers. Besides, name of an
asset may also influence the invest-
ment decision, and hence may enthuse
overvaluation and undervaluation
(Siebenmorgen and Weber 2000).
Predicated on expected utility
theory, the utility of an outcome is
weighed by its probability of occur-
rence and accordingly, individuals
should be indifferent to choices in-
volving equal expected utility (Elton
and Gruber 1995). Under the classic
utility theory, participants are expected
to choose among risky alternatives in
order to maximize their expected final
asset position. However, Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) (in Hunton,
McEwen, and Bhattacharjee 2001) pro-
pose a “prospect theory”, which postu-
lates that gains and losses are coded
relative to the status quo, not to the
final position. The reference point may
shift away from status quo if the par-
ticipant has suffered a recent loss and
failed to adapt to it, or failed to achieve
an expected gain. Hunton et al. (2001)
empirically examined the prospect
theory, and conclude that when placed
in a loss domain, individuals become
more risk-seeking and consequently
choose riskier alternatives. Conversely,
when placed in a gain situation, inves-
tors prefer certainty to risk since their
expectation levels have either met or
exceeded such that their reference
points have not shifted away from the
status quo. Bernstein (in Rothery 2001)
made a simple survey in which he
offered a tricky choice. Participants
could choose A to acquire a guaran-
teed gift of $3,000 or they might choose
B to have 80 percent chance of win-
ning $4,000 with 20 percent chance of
earning nothing. The result was 80
percent of participants answered A.
Subsequently, he offered another al-
ternative. Participants might choose A
to have 80 percent chance of losing
$4,000 with 20 percent chance of break-
ing even or they could choose B in
order to acquire a guaranteed loss of
$3,000. The result was unbelievable in
which 92 percent of the participants
answered A. Booth (2002) reveals that
investors are “loss-averse” rather than
“risk-averse”. This is not a mere se-
mantic distinction, but recognizes that
risk is relative to the investors’ current
status and not to some absolute levels.
3. Inefficient markets. Behavioral fi-
nance preaches that the heuristic-driven
bias and the framing effect engender
market prices to deviate from funda-
mental values, thereby leading to inef-
ficient markets. On the contrary, tradi-
tional finance retains its stand that
each security coincides with its intrin-
sic value and accordingly, markets are
perfectly efficient.
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As mentioned above, investor
overreaction hypothesis is one of the
most prominent evidence of market
anomalies. De Bondt and Thaler (1985)
find that over the period of 1926-1982,
stocks, represented on the Center for
Research in Security Prices data set of
the University of Chicago, whose re-
turns had been in the top decile across
firms over three years (winner stocks)
tended to show negative cumulative
returns in the succeeding three years.
Conversely, they find that loser stocks
whose returns had been in the bottom
decile over the prior three years were
prone to show positive returns over the
succeeding three years. In other words,
they find that when stocks were ranked
on 3- to 5-year past returns, past win-
ners tended to be future losers, and
vice versa. They argue that investors
overreact to events in a predictable
manner, overvaluing the best alterna-
tives while undervaluing the worst.
Premiums and discounts then prevail
since the past winners become over-
priced and past losers become under-
priced. Eventually, these circum-
stances reverse as assets regress to-
ward the mean. In forming expecta-
tions, investors give too much weight
to the past performance of firms and
too little to the fact that performance
tends to mean-revert. Meanwhile,
Shefrin and Statman (1985) (in Shefrin
2000) discovered the “disposition ef-
fect”. They explain that investors are
predisposed to holding losers too long
and selling winners too early. The evi-
dence is substantiated by the research
of Tiwari (1999) who proposes that if
there is a falling interest rate condi-
tion, investors had better sell the bond
as soon as possible whereas under ris-
ing interest rate condition, investors
should hold the bond longer. In this
case, investors believe in mean rever-
sion, thereby waiting the loser assets
to revert while they shun losses by
selling winning assets as soon as pos-
sible.
Although many recent studies on
long-term returns suggest market inef-
ficiency, Fama (1998) calmly re-
sponded that market efficiency theory
should not and could not be discarded
for two reasons:
1. An efficient market generates cat-
egories of events that individually
suggest that prices overreact to in-
formation. However, in an efficient
market, apparent underreaction
would be about as frequent as over-
reaction. If anomalies split randomly
between underreaction and overre-
action, they are consistent with mar-
ket efficiency.
2. If the long-term return anomalies
are so large that they could not be
attributed to chance, then an even
split between overreaction and
underreaction is a pyrrhic victory
for market efficiency. Besides, long-
term return anomalies are sensitive
to methodology. They tend to be-
come marginal or disappear when
exposed to different models or when
different statistical approaches are
utilized to measure them.
Subsequently, Fama (1998) elabo-
rates that investors falsely perceive
that there are two earnings regimes. In
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regime A, earnings are mean-revert-
ing. When investors decide to hold
regime A, a stock’s price underreacts
to a change in earnings since investors
mistakenly think that the change is
likely to be temporary. When this ex-
pectation is not confirmed by later
earnings, the stock price shows a de-
layed response to earlier earnings.
Regime A refers to the disposition
effect proposed by Shefrin and
Statman. In regime B, a run of earnings
changes in the same sign leads inves-
tors to perceive that a firm’s earnings
are trending. Once investors are con-
vinced that regime B holds, they incor-
rectly extrapolate the trend and then
the stock price overreacts. Since earn-
ings are a random walk, the overreac-
tion is exposed by future earnings,
leading to the reversal of long-term
returns. Regime B is exemplified by
overreaction hypothesis of De Bondt
and Thaler.
Accordingly, consistent with the
efficient market hypothesis that the
anomalies are chance results, apparent
overreaction of stock prices to infor-
mation is about as common as
underreaction (Fama 1998). Further-
more, post-even continuation of pre-
event abnormal returns is also as fre-
quent as post-even reversal. Most im-
portantly, according to Fama (1998),
the long-term return anomalies are frag-
ile in which they may disappear with
reasonable changes in the way they are
measured.
We can see from the review above
that both overreaction and underreac-
tion (disposition effect) hypotheses are
focused on mean-reverting-return phe-
nomenon. Behavioral finance propo-
nents have been proposing the belief in
mean reversion as their salient weapon
to prove that market efficiency cannot
be perfectly held. On the other hand,
Fama, the pioneer and the main propo-
nent of market efficiency postulates
that mean reversion of asset returns
exactly shows the market efficiency
since it proves that stock prices are at
random walk, hence either underreac-
tion or overreaction hypothesis has the
same possibility and frequency to per-
sist. Besides, mean reversion also ex-
hibits that market can automatically
correct the mistakenly-set prices.
Mean reversion or regression to-
ward the mean was discovered over
100 years ago by Sir Francis Galton
and it was named the law of universal
regression. In his famous paper, Galton
(1886) (in Gujarati 1995; Dreman
1998) finds that although there is a
tendency for tall parents to have tall
children and for short parents to have
short children, the average height of
children born of parents of a given
height tends to move or regress toward
the average height in the population as
a whole. The result of Galton can be
then applied for the securities market.
According to the classic work of
Ibbotson and Sinquefield (in Dreman
1998), stocks had returned 10.5 per-
cent annually over the last 70 years
while the returns on investing in bonds
were 5.6 percent. Short-term returns
that are extremely high or low should
be treated as deviations from long-
term norms (Graflund 2001). Accord-
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ingly, investors who realize and be-
lieve in mean-reverting phenomenon
will as much as possible invest in stocks
when their investment horizons are
long. The main rationale is that they
are convinced that stocks will always
give positive and higher returns than
will fixed-income securities in the long-
term condition. Hence, they will not
care about the risk and are sure that
average stock returns will always out-
perform those of fixed-income securi-
ties since it is a long-term norm of
regression toward the mean.
Siebenmorgen and Weber (2000) em-
pirically find that German market par-
ticipants significantly believe in mean-
reverting asset prices, and it is the
main explanation for their finding that
investors whose investment horizons
are long are prone to allocate higher
proportion of their funds in stocks.
Similar result is found by Frennberg
and Hansson (1993) (in Graflund 2001)
who researched on the Swedish stock
market, and prove that stock returns
exhibit a mean reversion. Risager
(1998) also finds that mean reversion
prevails on the Danish stock market. In
contrast, Graflund (2001) using
monthly nominal data for the period of
1947-1998 finds evidence that Nordic
stock markets (Finland, Sweden, Den-
mark, and Norway) are not subject to
mean reversion. This finding is in line
with the result of Nielsen and Olesen
(2000) who find a weak support for
mean reversion on the Danish stock
market. They remark that mean rever-
sion recently found on many capital
markets is due to the recent prevalent
high return-high volatility regime.
Subsequent to the contrary evi-
dence in the international markets, we
examine the mean-reverting-asset-
prices phenomenon as our second hy-
pothesis:
H2: Indonesian investors believe in
mean-reverting asset prices.
Research Method
Sample
We used the students of Master of
Science, Master of Management, and
Doctorate Programs at the Faculty of
Economics and Business, Universitas
Gadjah Mada, Indonesia as the sample
in this research. We delivered ques-
tionnaires to 217 students.  Several
rationales underlying our decision are:
(1) the population has an infinite char-
acteristic; (2) we do not have a com-
plete list of the population; (3) com-
pared to other types of investors, stu-
dents are practitioners who capture
and master the techniques of invest-
ment analysis and portfolio manage-
ment; and (4) the students of Master of
Management Program mostly have
backgrounds of practitioners, such as
brokers and investment managers,
whereas those of Master of Science
and Doctorate Programs are mostly
academics. Hence, the combination of
practitioners’ and academics’ views
may lead to more reliable research
evidence.
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In order to confirm that the par-
ticipants really understood the research
questions, we required that the partici-
pants be students who were taking or
had completed the portfolio manage-
ment course. Nevertheless, students
who passed intertwined courses such
as corporate finance and financial in-
stitutions management were admitted
as well.
Data Collection Method
Data collected in this study com-
prised both primary and secondary
data. As mentioned in the previous
section, we distributed questionnaires
to 217 respondents. The questionnaire
consisted of 4 pages. On the first page,
participants were requested to envis-
age as though they had inherited
IDR1,000,000,000, and they would
have invested the money (not for con-
sumption). We then offered three in-
vestment alternatives: (1) Indonesian
Composite Stock Price Index-Fund
(IHSG-Fund), (2) Japanese Nikkei 225
Index-Fund (N225-Fund), and (3) U.S.
Dow Jones Industrial Average Index–
Fund (DJIA-Fund).
We exhibited the historical re-
turns on those three investment alter-
natives. Half of the respondents got
the historical annual return informa-
tion, and the others were exhibited
historical five-year return information.
Subsequently, in depicting the histori-
cal returns, we divided the informa-
tion into five informational conditions:
R+ (1): We showed the participants
the names of the three invest-
ment alternatives and we also
presented historical annual
returns on those investments,
R+ (5): In this condition, we again
presented the names of the
investment alternatives, but
we showed the historical five-
year returns,
R- (1): The respondents did not know
the names of the investment
alternatives.  They were la-
belled “Stock Fund 1”, “Stock
Fund 2”, and “Stock Fund 3”.
In addition, we showed the
historical one-year returns,
R- (5): Once again people did not
know the real names of the
investment alternatives, but
they saw the historical five-
year returns,
N: In this condition, we only
showed the names of the in-
vestments without any histori-
cal return information.
The second page contained ques-
tions regarding the one-year invest-
ment horizon. The respondents might
envisage that next year would be their
pension ages, and they could not with-
draw the money up to one year. We
asked our participants three types of
questions:
1. Market expectations by estimating
a lower bound (10%-quantile), a
median value (50%-quantile), and
an upper bound (90%-quantile) for
IDR1,000,000,000 investment in
each of the investment alternatives.
2. Subjective risk assessments on each
of the three risky investments. The
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respondents were requested to as-
sess the risk of those three invest-
ment alternatives on a scale from 1
to 9 in which 1 means no risk and 9
refers to the highest risk.
3. Portfolio allocation offering a risk-
free investment opportunity and the
three risky investment alternatives.
Herein, we used an artificial risk-
free investment that constantly gave
a guaranteed annual return of 10
percent.
No sooner did they complete fill-
ing out their answers on page 2 of the
questionnaires, the participants went
on opening the next page of the ques-
tionnaires in which they were not al-
lowed to reopen page 2. Questions on
page 3 resembled those on page 2 with
a crucial distinction that we altered the
investment horizon into the five-year
investment horizon. At the time, the
participants were requested to envis-
age that they had to invest the money
but could not withdraw the money up
to the next five years. Eventually, on
page 4, we asked extra questions in
order to recognize something about
the belief in mean reversion. The par-
ticipants had to imagine that IHSG-
Fund (Stock Fund 1 in condition R-)
would have either won 50 percent or
lost 25 percent in the first year of
investing. We desire to know their
expectations regarding this investment
for the following four years, both after
gaining returns of 50 percent and after
losing 25 percent in the first year. In
this case, we again asked for estimates
of the lower bound, the median value,
and the upper bound. We required that
the respondents not use the informa-
tion of other respondents’ question-
naires to affirm that cognitive bias did
not influence the participants’ deci-
sions.
Variables, Measures, and Data
Analysis Methods
In the wake of collecting the data,
we compiled them to analyze and ex-
amine the hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Investment decisions
(allocation of funds in each asset in a
portfolio) in the short investment hori-
zon diverge with the investment deci-
sions in the long investment horizon
for Indonesian investors.
On page 2 and page 3 of our ques-
tionnaire, we requested the partici-
pants to allocate their funds in a port-
folio that consisted of a risk-free in-
vestment opportunity that offered a
guaranteed annual return of 10 per-
cent, and three risky investment alter-
natives, namely IHSG-Fund, N225-
Fund, and DJIA-Fund. The allocation
might be compiled for both short-term
horizon (one year) and long-term hori-
zon (five years).
It is imperative to explain that we
could not include the risk-free asset
for calculating the portfolio risk since
the covariance between any asset and
the risk-free asset must be zero. Hence,
in order to calculate the portfolio risk,
we made adjustments on the asset allo-
cation of each respondent. In order to
obtain the adjusted proportion of funds
invested in IHSG-Fund, we use the
following adjustment procedure:
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wIHSGj1 = adjusted proportion of funds
of participant j invested in
IHSG-Fund in one-year in-
vestment horizon,
PIHSGj1 = proportion of funds invested
in IHSG-Fund written by par-
ticipant j on the questionnaire
in one-year horizon,
PN225j1 = proportion of funds invested
in N225-Fund written by par-
ticipant j on the questionnaire
in one-year horizon,
PDJIAj1 = proportion of funds invested
in DJIA-Fund written by par-
ticipant j on the questionnaire
in one-year horizon,
PRFj1 = proportion of funds invested
in risk-free asset written by
participant j on the question-
naire in one-year horizon.
Equation (1) was then replicated
to find the adjusted proportion of funds
invested in N225-Fund and DJIA-Fund
of each participant, both in one-year
investment horizon and in five-year
investment horizon. To find the ad-
justed proportion of funds invested in
N225-Fund in one-year horizon, we
replaced the numerator in the equation
(1), namely from PIHSGj1 to PN225j1, and
so forth.
In the wake of collecting the data,
we calculated the portfolio risk of each
respondent by harnessing the
Markowian model.
sPj1 = portfolio risk of participant
j in one-year investment ho-
rizon,
sPj5 = portfolio risk of participant
j in five-year investment ho-
rizon,
wij1 = adjusted proportion of
funds invested in asset i
(IHSG-Fund: i=1, N225-
Fund: i=2, DJIA-Fund: i=3)
of participant j in one-year
horizon,
wij5 = adjusted proportion of
funds invested in asset i
(IHSG-Fund: i=1, N225-
Fund: i=2, DJIA-Fund: i=3)
of participant j in five-year
horizon,
sij1forecast = standard-deviation-of-ex-
pected-return forecast on
investment i of  participant
j in one-year horizon,
sij5forecast = standard-deviation-of-ex-
pected-return forecast on
WIHSGj1 = pIHSGj1 +
pIHSGj1
(pIHSGj1 + pN225j1 + pDJIAj1)
.pRFj1
............................................. (1) ΣWij12.σijlforcast2 +
ΣΣWij1.Wuj1.σ1jlforcast.σujlforcast.ρiujlforcast
...................................................................(2)
3
i=1
3
i=1
3
u=1
ΣWij52.σij5forcast2 +
ΣΣWij5.Wuj5.σ1j5forcast.σuj5forcast.ρiuj5forcast
...................................................................(3)
3
i=1
3
i=1
3
u=1
σPj5 =
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investment i of participant
j in five-year horizon,
wuj1 = proportion of funds in-
vested in asset u (IHSG-
Fund: u=1, N225- Fund:
u=2, DJIA-Fund: u=3) of
participant j in one-year ho-
rizon,
wuj5 = proportion of funds in-
vested in asset u (IHSG-
Fund: u=1, N225- Fund:
u=2, DJIA-Fund: u=3) of
participant j in five-year ho-
rizon,
suj1forecast = standard-deviation-of-ex-
pected-return forecast on
investment u of  participant
j in one-year horizon,
suj5forecast = standard-deviation-of-ex-
pected-return forecast on
investment u of participant
j in five-year horizon,
riu1forecast = correlation between ex-
pected return on asset i in
one-year horizon and ex-
pected return on asset u in
one-year horizon, where
riu1forecast = 1 for i = u,
riu5forecast = correlation between ex-
pected return on asset i in
five-year horizon and ex-
pected return on asset u in
five-year horizon, where
riu5forecast = 1 for i = u.
In order to examine the third hy-
pothesis, we compared sPj1 to sPj5 for
finding evidence whether the asset al-
location in the portfolio in short in-
vestment horizon is the same as or
significantly different from that in the
long investment horizon. In other
words, we wonder if the portfolio risk
to be assumed in the short horizon is
different from that in the long horizon.
Using the Wilcoxon W-test, we might
reject the null hypothesis if the p-value
is lower than the predetermined cre-
dence level (a) of five percent. Alter-
natively, we also examined the differ-
ence between the proportion of funds
invested in risk-free asset in the short
horizon and the proportion of funds
invested in the risk-free asset in the
long horizon.
The framing effect was again
tested utilizing the Kruskal-Wallis H-
test, as examined in the two previous
hypotheses. We desire to know whether
the respondents who on page 1 of the
questionnaires were given either only
the names of the investment alterna-
tives (N), only the historical returns
(R-), or the names and the historical
returns (R+), assumed the same port-
folio risk (sPj) or significantly differ-
ent. We checked for the framing effect
in both one-year horizon and five-year
horizon. Besides the testing, we also
examined the possible influence of
framing effect on the willingness to
hold the risk-free asset in the long
horizon (increased, decreased, or the
same willingness to allocate the funds
in the risk-free asset). Since the vari-
ables are discrete variables and in nomi-
nal scales, we used the chi-square (c2)
test to examine the effect.
Subsequently, we yearn to prove
whether there is a difference between
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sPj of the respondents who obtained the
historical one-year return information
on page 1 of the questionnaires and sPj
of the respondents who acquired the
historical five-year return information
on page 1 of the questionnaires. We
used the Mann-Whitney U-test to ex-
amine the statistical informational ef-
fect on the willingness to assume the
portfolio risk. The test was made for
both one-year and five-year invest-
ment horizons. Furthermore, we ex-
amined the possible influence of sta-
tistical informational effect on the will-
ingness to hold the risk-free asset in
the long horizon (increased, decreased,
or the same willingness to allocate the
funds in the risk-free asset). Again, we
used the chi-square (c2) test to exam-
ine the effect.
Hypothesis 2: Indonesian investors
believe in mean-reverting asset prices
In the hypothesis 4, we desire to
know whether the recommendations
of investment managers that investors
increase the proportion of riskier as-
sets in their portfolios are derived from
a belief in mean reversion. For that, we
asked extra questions on page 4 of our
questionnaire. The participants were
requested to envisage that IHSG-Fund
(Stock Fund 1 in condition R-) had
either won 50 percent or lost 25 per-
cent in the first year of investing. We
want to know their expectations re-
garding this asset for the following
four years, both after gaining returns
of 50 percent and after losing 25 per-
cent in the first year. In this case, we
again asked for the estimates of lower
bound, median value, and upper bound.
We utilized the estimator of
Pearson and Tukey that had been ap-
plied by Siebenmorgen et al. (2000)
and Siebenmorgen and Weber (2000).
The formula is as follows:
E(R)ij =0.3 ln(Yijl0.1/1,000,000,000) +
0.4 ln(Yijm0.5/1,000,000,000) +
0.3 ln(Yiju
0.9/1,000,000,000)
....................................................(4)
E(R)ij = expected return on invest-
ment i of participant j,
Yijl = lower bound estimate on in-
vestment i of participant j,
Yijm = median value estimate on in-
vestment i of participant j,
Yiju = upper bound estimate on in-
vestment i of participant j.
sijforecast = standard-deviation-of-ex-
pected-return forecast on in-
vestment i of participant j,
Yijl = lower bound estimate on in-
vestment i of participant j,
Yijm = median value estimate on in-
vestment i of participant j,
Yiju = upper bound estimate on in-
vestment i of participant j,
E(R)ij = expected return on invest-
ment i of participant j.
σ1jforecast =
[0.3 ln(Yij
0.1/1,000,000,000)2 +
0.4 ln(Yijm
0.5/1,000,000,000)2 +
0.3 ln(Yij
0.9/1,000,000,000)2 ] - [E(R)ij]
2
....................................................(5)
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Using equation (4), we could trans-
form the lower bound, the median
value, and the upper bound into the
conditional expected return on IHSG-
fund of participant j for the subsequent
four years after gaining 50 percent in
the first year [denoted as E(R)IHSGj1J5|
RIHSGj1= ln(1.5)] and the conditional
expected return on IHSG-fund of par-
ticipant j for the subsequent four years
in the wake of losing 25 percent in the
first year [denoted as E(R)IHSGj1J5|
RIHSGj1= ln(0.75)]. Subsequently, uti-
lizing equation (5), we were able to
calculate their standard deviations,
namely σIHSGj1J5forecast|RIHSGj1= ln(1.5)
and σIHSGj1J5forecast|RIHSGj1 = ln(0.75), re-
spectively.
The historical returns on the three
investment alternatives (IHSG-Fund,
N225-Fund, and DJIA-Fund) were
calculated, both one-year returns and
five-year returns. We calculated the
annual returns as follows:
)/i(iln   R tbteit =
.............................................(6)
Rit = return on investment i (i = IHSG-
Fund, N225-Fund, DJIA-Fund)
in year t (t = 1970-2002 for  N225-
Fund and DJIA-Fund, but t =
1985-2002 for IHSG-Fund),
ite = value or price of investment i the
end of year t,
itb = value or price of investment i at
the beginning of year t.
Therefore, we obtained RIHSG1985-
RIHSG2002, RN2251970-RN2252002, and
RDJIA1970-RDJIA2002.  Subsequently, we
calculated the average annual returns
as follows:
..........................................(7)
µi1 = average annual return on invest-
ment i,
Rit = return on investment i in year t.
Equation (7) above was intended
to calculate the average annual returns
on N225-Fund and DJIA-Fund. How-
ever, for IHSG-Fund, we had to adjust
the number of the years since we only
had the historical data of IHSG from
1985.
.......................................(8)
µi1 = average annual return on invest-
ment i (i = IHSG-Fund),
Rit = return on investment i (i = IHSG-
Fund) in year t.
Eventually, we calculated the his-
torical one-year return on each asset as
follows:
1e  R al(point)i1historic −= ilµ
...............................................(9)
Ri1historical(point) = historical one-year re-
turn on investment i,
e = the base of natural loga-
rithms,
µi1 =
ΣRit
2002
t=1970
33
µi1 =
ΣRit
2002
t=1985
18
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mi1 = average annual return
on investment i.
The method of calculating his-
torical five-year returns on each in-
vestment alternative was analogous
with that of calculating the historical
one-year returns.
We then calculated the standard
deviation of the annual returns as fol-
lows:
..............................................(10)
σi1 = standard deviation of annual re-
turn on investment i,
µi1 = average annual return on invest-
ment i,
Rit = return on investment i in year t.
The equation above was used for
calculating the standard deviation of
the annual returns on N225-Fund and
DJIA-Fund. However, for IHSG-Fund,
we again had to adjust the number of
the years as follows:
............................................(11)
σi1 = standard deviation of annual re-
turn on investment i (i = IHSG-
Fund),
µi1 = average annual return on invest-
ment i (i = IHSG-Fund),
Rit = return on investment i (i = IHSG-
Fund) in year t.
Subsequently, we calculated the
historical standard deviation of one-
year return on each investment using
the following formula:
σi1historical(point)= historical standard de-
viation of one-year re-
turn on investment i,
e = the base of natural loga-
rithms,
µi1 = average annual return
on investment i,
σi1 = standard deviation of
annual return on invest-
ment i.
The calculation of the historical
standard deviation of five-year returns
on each investment alternative was
analogous with that of historical stan-
dard deviation of one-year returns.
Using equations (6), (7), (8), (9),
(10), (11), and (12), we obtained
E(R)IHSGj1 and E(R)IHSGj5 with their stan-
dard deviations, viz. σIHSGj1forecast and
σIHSGj5forecast, respectively. Hence, due
to the additivity of the log-returns
(Siebenmorgen and Weber 2000), we
calculated the unconditional expected
return on IHSG-Fund of participant j
for the next four years after the end of
the first year using the following for-
mula:
E(R)IHSGj1J5 = E(R)IHSGj5 - E(R)IHSGj1
................................................(13)
σi1 = ΣRit - µi1)2
2002
t=1970
33
σi1 = ΣRit - µi1)2
2002
t=1985
18
      σilhistorical (point)=     e2
µil.(e2µil - 1)
...............................................(12)
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It must be noted that E(R)IHSGj1à5 is
different from E(R)IHSGj1J5|RIHSGj1 =
ln(1.5) and E(R)IHSGj1J 5|RIHSGj1 =
ln(0.75) where E(R)IHSGj1J5 is the un-
conditional expected returns yielded
by harnessing the additivity of the log-
returns whereas the latter two are the
conditional expected returns after gain-
ing 50 percent and losing 25 percent in
the first year, respectively. However,
σIHSGj1J5forecast ¹ σIHSGj5forecast - σIHSGj1forecast.
In order to find σIHSGj1J5forecast, we have
to utilize the following formula:
σIHSGj5forecast
2 = σIHSGj1forecast
2 +
σIHSGj1J5forecast
2 +
2 Cov[E(R)IHSGj1,
E(R)IHSGj1J5]
     ............................................(14)
Subsequently, we looked for the
covariance between the expected re-
turn on IHSG-Fund in the first year
and the expected return on IHSG-Fund
in the subsequent four years, in both
winning 50 percent in the first year
condition (denoted as [Cov(E(R)IHSGj1,
E(R)IHSGj1J5)]1) and losing 25 percent
in the first year condition (denoted as
[Cov(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)]2). We
calculated the covariances using the
following formula:
[E(R)IHSGj1J5 | RIHSGj1 = ln(1.5)]= condi-
tional expected return on IHSG-fund
of vparticipant j for the subsequent
four years after gaining 50 percent in
the first year,
[E(R)IHSGj1J5 | RIHSGj1 = ln(0.75)]= con-
ditional expected return on IHSG-fund
of participant j for the subsequent four
years in the wake of losing 25 percent
in the first year,
E(R)IHSGj1J5 = unconditional expected
return on IHSG-Fund of participant j
for the next four years after the end of
the first year,
E(R)IHSGj1 = expected return on IHSG-
Fund of participant j in one-year in-
vestment horizon,
σIHSGj1forecast = standard-deviation-of-
expected-return forecast on IHSG-
Fund of participant j in one-year in-
vestment horizon,
[Cov(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)]1 = cova-
riance between the expected return on
IHSG-Fund of participant j in the first
year and the expected return on IHSG-
Fund of participant j in the subsequent
four years, in the condition of gaining
50 percent in the first year,
[E(R)IHSGj1J5| RIHSGj1 = ln(0.75)]=
E(R)IHSGj1J5 +
(ln(0.75) - E(R)IHSGj1)
.................................................(16)
[Cov(E(R)IHSGj1, E(R)IHSGj1J5]2
σIHSGj5forecast
x
[E(R)IHSGj1J5| RIHSGj1 = ln(1.5)]=
E(R)IHSGj1J5 +
(ln(1.5) - E(R)IHSGj1)
.................................................(15)
[Cov(E(R)IHSGj1, E(R)IHSGj1J5]1
σIHSGj5forecast
x
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[Cov(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)]2 = cova-
riance between the expected return on
IHSG-Fund of participant j in the first
year and the expected return on IHSG-
Fund of participant j in the subsequent
four years, in the condition of losing
25 percent in the first year.
Since [E(R)IHSGj1J 5|RIHSGj1=
ln(1.5)], [E(R)IHSGj1J5|RIHSGj1= ln(0.75)],
E(R)IHSGj1J5, E(R)IHSGj1, and sIHSGj1forecast
were known, using equation (15) and
equation (16), we could find
[Cov(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J 5)]1 and
[Cov(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J 5)]2. We
then substituted [Cov(E(R)IHSGj1,
E(R)IHSGj1J5)]1 and [Cov(E(R)IHSGj1,
E(R)IHSGj1à5)]2 into the equation (14) in
order to obtain (sIHSGj1J5forecast)1 and
(sIHSGj1J5forecast)2. It is realized that a
covariance is derived from a correla-
tion between two variables multiplied
by their standard deviations. Hence,
we then applied the concept into
[Cov(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J 5)]1 and
[Cov(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)]2 where:
[Cov(E(R)IHSGj1, E(R)IHSGj1J5)]1=
σIHSGj1forecast . (σIHSGj1J5forecast)1 .
ρ(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)1
............................................(17)
[Cov(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)]2 =
σIHSGj1forecast . (σIHSGj1J5forecast)2 .
σ(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)2
............................................(18)
Eventually, utilizing Equations
(17) and (18), we could find
ρ(E(R)IHSGj1, E(R)IHSGj1J5)1, which is the
correlation between the expected re-
turn on IHSG-Fund of participant j in
the first year and the expected return
on IHSG-Fund of participant j in the
subsequent four years, in the condition
of gaining 50 percent in the first year,
and r(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)2, which
is the correlation between the expected
return on IHSG-Fund of participant j
in the first year and the expected return
on IHSG-Fund of participant j in the
subsequent four years, in the condition
of having a loss of  25 percent in the
first year.
We examined ρ(E(R)IHSGj1,
E(R)IHSGj1J 5)1 and ρ(E(R)IHSGj1,
E(R)IHSGj1J5)2 by harnessing the one-
sample t-test. We might reject the null
hypothesis if r(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)1
and r(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)2 were sig-
nificantly below zero at the credence
level of five percent. In other words, if
both correlations are significantly
negative, it indicates that investors who
remarkably experience gaining 50 per-
cent in the first year tend to expect less
for the next four years and on the
contrary, the investors who sadly ex-
perience having a loss of 25 percent in
the first year are prone to expect higher
returns for the subsequent four years.
Data Analysis and Discussion
The first null hypothesis postu-
lates that the asset allocation in the
portfolio in short investment horizon
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is the same as that in the long invest-
ment horizon The portfolio allocation
in each asset in the short horizon and
that in the long horizon mirror the
influence of different investment hori-
zons on the investment decision. Be-
sides, the difference between the risk-
free asset holding in the short horizon
and that in the long horizon was also
examined. We firstly tested the nor-
mality of the data whose results are
exhibited in the Table 1.
The results above show that at the
confidence level of five percent, the
data of portfolio risk in the long invest-
ment horizon were not normally dis-
tributed. Consequently, we used the
nonparametric tests to examine the
first hypothesis.
In order to examine the first hy-
pothesis, we compared σPj1 with sPj5
using the Wilcoxon test. Since the
portfolio risk is influenced by the
weights or the proportion of funds on
each asset and the covariances among
the assets, we are able to know whether
the allocation of funds in the risky
assets in the short horizon is the same
as that in the long horizon. In other
words, we can find whether the invest-
ment decisions of participants in the
shorter investment horizon are the same
as those in the longer investment hori-
zon. The testing results are shown in
Table 2.
From the Table 2, it is signifi-
cantly proved that the participants are
inclined to assume higher portfolio
risk in the longer investment horizon
than the portfolio risk in the shorter
investment horizon. Accordingly, the
participants’ underestimation of risk
Table 1. Normality Tests on the Portfolio Risk Data
Variable Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z
σPj1 0.545
σPj5 1.402*
* significant at the credence level of 5 percent,
** significant at the credence level of 1 percent
Table 2.Tests of the Difference between Portfolio Risk in One-year Horizon
and That in Five-year Horizon
Variable Mean Median Z
One-year 0.388610729 0.397088988 -11.120 **
Five-year 0.644150315 0.668705984
*   significant at the credence level of 5 percent,
** significant at the credence level of 1 percent.
σPj
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in the longer investment horizon drives
to the higher risk-adjusted expected
returns in the long investment horizon
than the risk-adjusted expected returns
in the short horizon. Finally, it leads to
their willingness to assume higher port-
folio risk in the longer investment ho-
rizon than in the shorter investment
horizon. Hence, we may reject the first
null hypothesis since there is a signifi-
cant difference between the portfolio
risk to be assumed by the respondents
in the short investment horizon and
that in the long investment horizon.
The finding seems more consistent
with the common belief of investment
practitioners and the recommendation
of investment managers for their in-
vestors that the longer their invest-
ment horizons, the higher the invest-
DJIA-Fund
31.91%
IHSG-Fund
20.47%N225-Fund
22.06%
Risk-Free
Asset
25.56%
Figure 1. Asset Allocation in Short Investment Horizon
Figure 2. Asset Allocation in Long Investment Horizon
DJIA-Fund
31.67%
IHSG-Fund
19.95%N225-Fund
21.61%
Risk-Free
Asset
26.77%
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ment risk to be assumed by investing
in riskier assets.
Alternatively, we also examined
the difference between the risk-free
asset holding in the short horizon and
that in the long horizon. The result is
depicted in Figure 1, Figure 2, and
Table 3.
From the data received, we have
calculated and found that 58 partici-
pants increased their allocation in the
risk-free asset, 41 respondents de-
creased their risk-free asset proportion
in their portfolios, and 73 respondents
allocated the same proportion of risk-
free asset in their portfolios. It is very
startling to see in Figure 1 and Figure
2 that on average, the participants are
prone to increase their allocation in the
risk-free asset in the longer investment
horizon. Indeed, most of the respon-
dents desire to allocate the same pro-
portion of their funds in the risk-free
asset. Moreover, the difference be-
tween the risk-free asset holding in the
short investment horizon and that in
the long investment horizon is not sig-
nificant. Nevertheless, the finding that
the participants tend to have a willing-
ness to assume higher portfolio risk in
the longer investment horizon while
they tend to increase their allocation of
funds in risk-free asset as well seems
to be conflicting one another. This
study’s result yields a phenomenon
associated to the basic assumption of
financial theory. The financial theory
postulates that investors are risk averse,
meaning that in order for the investors
to assume higher risk on their invest-
ments, they must be sufficiently com-
pensated by higher expected returns.
However, the evidence of this study
indicates that the investors are loss
averse. They tend to have a willing-
ness to assume higher risk on their
portfolios in the long investment hori-
zon as they tend to give higher risk-
adjusted expected returns in the long
horizon, but at the same time they also
increase their holdings of risk-free as-
set. Accordingly, not only are the in-
vestors risk averse, but they are also
loss-averse investors.
Subsequently, the possibility that
the framing effect influences the in-
vestment decisions was examined. The
Kruskal-Wallis test was harnessed to
find whether the participants who re-
ceived either only the names and de-
scriptions of the three risky invest-
ments (N), only the historical returns
Table 3. Tests of the Difference between Risk-free Asset Holding in One-year
Horizon and That in Five-year Horizon
Variable Mean Median Z
One-year 0.255610465 0.200000000 -1.520
Five-year 0.267674419 0.205000000
* significant at the credence level of 5 percent,
** significant at the credence level of 1 percent.
RF
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(R-), or the names and the historical
returns (R+) had a willingness to make
the same investment decisions by as-
suming the same portfolio risk. The
results are depicted in the following
table.
Table 4 shows that the framing
effect significantly influences the in-
vestment decisions, both in short in-
vestment horizon and in long invest-
ment horizon. The respondents who
received our questionnaires in N con-
dition tended to have a willingness to
assume higher portfolio risk than those
who received the questionnaires in R+
and R- conditions. Therefore, the evi-
dence substantiates the finding that
when the respondents only know the
names of the assets but do not have any
information on the historical return on
the risky assets, they hinge on their
personal judgments about the prospect
and the riskiness of those assets, in-
cluding the popularity of those invest-
ment alternatives. Overall, we find that
the participants who received the re-
search questionnaires in N condition
tended to give higher expectations,
either the expected returns, the stan-
dard deviation forecasts, or the invest-
Table 5. Tests of Framing Effect on the Risk-free Asset Holdings
Frame
N R- R+
Variable Number of Number of Number of χ2
Respondents Respondents Respondents
Increase 16 15 27 0.462
Decrease 8 18 15
The same 17 26 30
*   significant at the credence level of 5 percent,
** significant at the credence level of 1 percent.
RF
Holdings
Table 4. Tests of Framing Effect on the Expected Return Biases
Frame
Variable N R- R+ χ2
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
One-year 0.4326 0.4168 0.3784 0.3651 0.3718 0.3629 7.221*
Five-year 0.6841 0.6927 0.6217 0.6595 0.6397 0.6586 7.434*
* significant at the credence level of 5 percent,
** significant at the credence level of 1 percent.
σpj
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ment decisions, than those who re-
ceived the questionnaires in R+ and R-
conditions.
Alternatively, we tested the influ-
ence of framing effect on the risk-free
asset holdings, both in short horizon
and in long horizon. We used the chi-
square test to examine the effect. Table
5 exhibits the findings.
We do not find any significant
influence of the framing effect on the
risk-free asset holdings, either in-
creased, decreased, or the same hold-
ings of the risk-free asset in the long
investment horizon.
Furthermore, using the Mann-
Whitney test, we checked for the sta-
tistical informational effect on the in-
vestment decisions. This study tries to
find whether the willingness to as-
sume the portfolio risk is different if it
is conditioned by the statistical infor-
mation presented on the first page of
the research questionnaires, either the
historical annual returns or the histori-
cal five-year returns.
Table 6. Tests of Statistical Informational Effect on the Investment Decisions
Statistical Information
Variable Annual Returns Five-year Returns
Mean Median Mean Median U
One-year 0.35658 0.34317 0.39653 0.39708 1792.000
Five-year 0.62789 0.66100 0.63603 0.65836 2081.000
* significant at the credence level of 5 percent,
** significant at the credence level of 1 percent.
σPj
Table 7. Tests of Statistical Informational Effect on the Risk-free Asset
Holdings
Statistical Information
Annual Returns Five-year
Returns χ2
Variable Number of Number of
Respondents Respondents
Increase 20 22 4.044
Decrease 15 18
The same 36 20
* significant at the credence level of 5 percent,
** significant at the credence level of 1 percent.
RF Holdings
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From Table 6, we can see that
there is a tendency for the respondents
to show a willingness to assume higher
portfolio risk when they received the
questionnaires that provided the his-
torical five-year returns on the first
page. The possible rationale for this
evidence is that the historical five-year
returns seldom show negative returns
or show losses while the historical
annual returns seem to be more vola-
tile in terms of gains and losses. Hence,
investors were inclined to assume
higher portfolio risk when they got the
historical five-year returns on the first
page of the questionnaires subsequent
to their feelings of high possibility to
earn positive returns. However, the
statistical informational effect is not
significant, both in short horizon and
in long horizon.
Afterwards, we also examined the
statistical informational effect on the
risk-free asset holdings. The follow-
ing table depicts the results.
The results shown in Table 7 indi-
cate that the investors’ willingness to
increase, decrease, or maintain their
proportion of funds in risk-free asset is
not associated with the statistical in-
formation provided on the first page of
the questionnaires.
Subsequently, we examined the
second hypothesis, which is whether
the investors’ willingness to assume
higher portfolio risk in the long invest-
ment horizon is derived from a belief
in mean-reverting asset prices. Mean
reversion means that in the long run,
the value of any security will always
return to the mean value although in
the short run, the value may fluctuate.
It indicates that the price of an asset
recently experiencing a huge loss com-
pared to its average returns will in-
crease in the future, and vice versa, the
price of an asset lately experiencing a
much-above-average-return gain will
decline in the future.
Technically, we examined
r(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J 5)1 and
r(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)2 utilizing the
one-sample t-test.
r(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)1 is the corre-
lation between the expected return on
IHSG-Fund (Stock Fund 1 in R- condi-
tion) of participant j in the first year
and the expected return on IHSG-Fund
of participant j in the subsequent four
years, in the condition of gaining 50
percent in the first year, whereas
(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)2 is the correla-
tion between the expected return on
IHSG-Fund (Stock Fund 1 in R- condi-
tion) of participant j in the first year
and the expected return on IHSG-Fund
of participant j in the subsequent four
years, in the condition of having a loss
of  25 percent in the first year. We
reject the null hypothesis that Indone-
sian investors do not believe in mean
reversion if r(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1à5)1 is
significantly below zero and the
r(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)2 likewise. The
testing results are depicted in Figure 3,
Figure 4, and Table 8.
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Figure 3. Descriptive Statistics of ρ(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)1
Coefficient of Correlation
Figure 4. Descriptive Statistics of ρ(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)2
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Either r(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)1 or
r(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)2 exhibits a
positive and significant value. Accord-
ingly, this study cannot reject the sec-
ond null hypothesis. What interesting
is that not only do we not find the belief
in mean-reverting asset prices in Indo-
nesia, but we also find a reverse phe-
nomenon of the belief. The positive
value of r(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)1 in-
dicates that the investors predict an
asset gaining 50 percent in the first
year to continuously gain in the next
four years. In turn, the positive value
exhibited by r(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)2
means that the investors expect an
asset losing 25 percent in the first year
to continuously loss in the next four
years. This phenomenon can be la-
beled as a belief in “persistent asset
prices”. Hence, Indonesian investors
do not believe in mean-reverting asset
prices.
Conclusions
After examining the two hypoth-
eses and several effects, we find evi-
dence as follows:
1. It is significantly proved that Indo-
nesian investors are inclined to as-
sume higher portfolio risk in the
longer investment horizon than that
in the shorter investment horizon.
The investors’ underestimation of
risk in the longer investment hori-
zon drives to the higher risk-ad-
justed expected returns in the long
investment horizon than those in
the short horizon. Finally, it leads
to their willingness to assume higher
portfolio risk in the longer invest-
ment horizon than that in the shorter
investment horizon. Hence, we may
reject the first null hypothesis. The
finding seems more consistent with
the common belief of investment
practitioners and the recommenda-
tion of investment managers for
their investors that the longer their
investment horizons, the higher the
investment risk to be assumed by
investing in riskier assets.
2. It is very interesting to see that on
average, the investors are inclined
to increase their allocation in the
risk-free asset in the longer invest-
ment horizon although the differ-
ence between the risk-free asset
holding in the short investment ho-
rizon and that in the long invest-
ment horizon is not significant. The
Table 8. Tests of the Belief in Mean-reverting Asset Prices
Variable Mean t
ρ(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)1 0.361638233 12.465 **
r(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1J5)2 0.131290085 3.607 **
* significant at the credence level of 5 percent,
** significant at the credence level of 1 percent.
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evidence of this study indicates that
the investors are loss averse. They
tend to have a willingness to as-
sume higher risk on their portfolios
in the long investment horizon as
they tend to give higher risk-ad-
justed expected returns in the long
horizon, but at the same time they
also increase their holdings of risk-
free asset. Accordingly, not only
are the investors risk-averse, but
they are also loss-averse investors.
3. The framing effect significantly
influences the investment decisions,
both in short investment horizon
and in long investment horizon.
The respondents who received our
questionnaires in N condition
tended to have a willingness to as-
sume higher portfolio risk than the
respondents who received the ques-
tionnaires in R+ and R- conditions.
However, we do not find any sig-
nificant influence of the framing
effect on the risk-free asset hold-
ings, either increased, decreased,
or the same holdings of the risk-
free asset in the long investment
horizon.
4. There is a tendency for the respon-
dents to show a willingness to as-
sume higher portfolio risk when
they received the questionnaires
that provided the historical five-
year returns on the first page. The
possible rationale for this evidence
is that the historical five-year re-
turns seldom show negative returns
or show losses while the historical
annual returns seem to fluctuate
more in terms of gains and losses.
However, the statistical informa-
tional effect is not significant, both
in short horizon and in long hori-
zon.
5. Either r(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1à5)1 or
r(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1à5)2 exhibits a
positive and significant value. The
positive value of
r(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1à5)1 indicates
that the investors predict an asset
gaining 50 percent in the first year
to continuously gain in the next
four years. On the other hand, the
positive value exhibited by
r(E(R)IHSGj1,E(R)IHSGj1à5)2 means that
the investors expect an asset losing
25 percent in the first year to con-
tinuously loss in the next four years.
This phenomenon can be labeled as
a belief in “persistent asset prices”.
Accordingly, Indonesian investors
do not believe in mean-reverting
asset prices, and hence this study
substantiates the second null hy-
pothesis.
Implications
Based on the findings, there are
several implications for investment
community:
1. In making investment decisions,
investors should consider their in-
vestment horizons. The longer their
horizons, the higher their opportu-
nities to put their funds in riskier
assets.
2. Due to the tendency of the inves-
tors to have a willingness to assume
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higher portfolio risk in the longer
investment horizon, the investment
managers, including the mutual
fund managers, should accommo-
date this intent. The investment pro-
fessionals should recommend and
offer their investors whose invest-
ment horizons are long to invest in
riskier assets while recommending
their investors whose horizons are
short to invest in less risky assets.
3. This study finds that the framing
effect is inclined to have an influ-
ence on the expected returns, the
risk perception, and the investment
decisions when the investors do not
well recognize the characteristics
of the assets. In the situation, they
hinge on their personal judgments
on the assets where the popularity
of the assets may also affect the
investors’ decisions. Unfortunately,
the fact shows that the popular as-
sets do not necessarily provide
higher risk-adjusted returns vis-à-
vis the less popular assets. Hence,
in order to minimize the framing
effect in the real investing circum-
stances, investors should analyze
the fundamentals of those assets
prior to choosing assets or estab-
lishing portfolios.
Limitations and Suggestions
Research on the investment hori-
zons is still a new study in Indonesia,
and we acknowledge that this study
has limitations to be improved by fu-
ture researchers. The limitations are as
follows:
1. Sample used in this research is post-
graduate students of Universitas
Gadjah Mada, Indonesia. The stu-
dents may come from various back-
grounds, not necessarily financial
managers or investors. Hence, next
research had better add people who
have experienced trading securi-
ties in the capital market in the
research sample.
2. This study does not examine the
sequence effect, which is whether
the investment decisions of respon-
dents who firstly answer the ques-
tions regarding short horizon and
finally answer the questions regard-
ing long horizon are different from
those of respondents who firstly
answer the questions regarding long
horizon and then answer the ques-
tions regarding short horizon.
Therefore, future studies would
rather examine this effect.
3. This study tries to analyze the in-
fluence of investment horizons and
the belief in mean reversion from
the behavioral point of view. It will
be better if there is research on this
topic in Inzdonesia that analyzes
the influence of investment hori-
zon from the market point of view,
which is how the stock prices re-
flect the influence of the different
investment horizons and the belief
in mean reversion.
4. One of the natural weaknesses of
behavioral finance is the distinc-
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tion between the perceptions and
the virtual behaviors. The percep-
tions given by the participants do
not necessarily mean that the re-
spondents will precisely conduct
what they have answered in the
questionnaires. Hence, biases in
behavioral finance research are not
impossible.
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